Research

with Jia Wei Zhang

A seller sets one price and offers a sales-contingent contract to an influencer who privately observes product fit but cannot commit to a recommendation rule. We characterize when compensation makes the seller-optimal disclosure credible and when its profit gain covers the communication cost. Hiring can change prices, redistribute consumer surplus, and reduce welfare.

Influencer marketing · Strategic communication · Information disclosure · Bayesian persuasion

We study price and quality competition when some consumers mistake inferior products for superior ones and can return mistaken purchases. Returns make a seller’s net revenue from inferior quality hump-shaped in price, producing equilibria with either contiguous price supports or a gap between inferior- and superior-product prices. Whether sellers or consumers bear return costs determines quality provision and welfare.

with Mingzhao Dai and Jia Wei Zhang

We study how media power affects costly evidence acquisition in a disclosure game with competing senders. Public persuasion changes both receiver beliefs and incentives to produce hard evidence. Asymmetric media access lets an advantaged sender avoid acquisition, while symmetric access can reveal information at low costs but suppress evidence production when costs are high.