Yushan Meng

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Education

Universität Konstanz, Germany 2022 – Present
Ph.D. in Economics *Supervisors: Susanne Goldlücke, Bernhard Kasberger*

Universität Bonn, Germany 2019 – 2022
M.Sc. in Economics

Zhengzhou University, China 2014 – 2018
Bachelor of Finance

Reasearch Interest

Applied Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Information Design

Working Paper

When to Hire an Influencer? (with Jiawei Zhang)

When does a seller hire a paid influencer, and what can the influencer credibly implement? A seller sets one price and offers a sales-contingent contract. The influencer observes product fit but cannot commit to a recommendation rule; only consumers in her audience observe her message. We first solve costless Bayesian persuasion as a commitment benchmark. A paid influencer can implement the seller-optimal disclosure rule only if compensation makes her recommendation credible and the resulting profit gain covers the communication cost. Hiring therefore occurs below a reach-dependent cost threshold. In the baseline, hiring either brings an excluded audience into the market at the same price or replaces broad low-price sales with selective sales at a higher price. The latter transfers surplus from consumers outside the audience to the seller and can reduce welfare. With general outside demand, the cost threshold survives, but price and welfare effects need not have fixed signs.

Return Policy with Naive Consumers

We study price and quality competition when some consumers mistake inferior products for superior ones and can return mistaken purchases. Returns make a seller's net revenue from inferior quality hump-shaped in price: a higher price raises revenue when the product is kept but also induces more costly returns. Consequently, symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria can have either contiguous quality-specific price supports or a gap between inferior- and superior-product prices. Seller-borne return costs discourage inferior quality, whereas consumer-borne return costs weaken this discipline. Because realized returns destroy resources, greater superior-quality provision need not imply higher welfare. The results show that the incidence of return costs, and not only the existence of a return right, determines the quality and welfare effects of return regulation.

Working in Progress

Persuade before Evidence (with Mingzhao Dai, Jiawei Zhang)

We study how media power affects costly evidence acquisition in a disclosure game with competing senders. Two opposed senders attempt to persuade a receiver who chooses an action under uncertainty. Before evidence is acquired, one or both senders can choose a public experiment that shifts the common interim belief. Senders then decide whether to acquire costly hard evidence and whether to disclose it. Media power changes outcomes by altering not only receiver beliefs but also the incentives to produce evidence. Asymmetric media access allows the advantaged sender to avoid costly acquisition by moving beliefs into favorable continuation regions. With symmetric access, media competition is fully revealing when acquisition costs are low, but can suppress evidence acquisition when costs are high. The results connect competitive disclosure, costly evidence acquisition, and Bayesian persuasion by showing how public narratives shape the endogenous supply of hard information.

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant — Winter semester 2022-
Advanced Microeconomics I — *(Tutorial, Master level)*

Teaching Assistant — Summer Semester 2023-
Microeconomics II (Game Theory) — *(Tutorial, Bachelor level)*

Conferences and Seminars

2026

- Brown Bad Seminar (Konstanz, Germany), The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications #15(Lisbon, Portugal), 2nd Berlin PhD Conference in Economics (Berlin, Germany) (poster)

2025

- Brown Bad Seminar (Konstanz, Germany), The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications #14(Lisbon, Portugal), 1st Berlin Micro Theory & Behavioral Economics PhD Conference (Berlin ,Germany) (poster), Doctoral Workshop in Microeconomics (Konstanz, Germany)

2024

- Brown Bag Seminar (Konstanz, Germany), Berlin Micro Theory Ph.D. Workshop (Berlin ,Germany), Swiss Theory Day (Bern ,Swiss)

Skills

Language: Mandarin (Native), English (Professional), Cantonese (Intermediate), German (Basic)
Programming: Latex, R, Stata, z-Tree, Mathematica