Yushan Meng

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Education

Universität Konstanz, Germany 2022 – Present
Ph.D. in Economics *Supervisors: Susanne Goldlücke, Bernhard Kasberger*

Universität Bonn, Germany 2019 – 2022
M.Sc. in Economics

Zhengzhou University, China 2014 – 2018
Bachelor of Finance

Reasearch Interest

Applied Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Information Design

References

Susanne GOLDLÜCKE
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University of Konstanz
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Bernhard KASBERGER
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Sebastian BERVOETS
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Working Paper

Performance Contracts for Noncontractible Recommendations (with Jiawei Zhang)
Job Market Paper

How should a seller pay a recommender when sales are verifiable but the recommendation is noncontractible, and what can the contract guarantee when advice costs are private? We show that at most two publicly observed contracts conditional on sales yield the seller's highest payoff in some equilibrium. A behavior contract combines low cost promotion with high cost recommendation for credibility, while a truthful contract carries any remaining truthful service. Direct commitment avoids the resulting information and message rents, so its value is weakly higher. With state independent message costs, delegation attains the commitment value in equilibrium, but pooling limits its guarantee to no communication. Profitable campaigns require a mix of consumers who can be influenced by recommendations and those who provide stable demand, while uniform pricing extends their effects to consumers who never see the recommendation.

Return Policy and Competition with Naive Consumers

We study how a mandated return right affects price and quality when some consumers mistake inferior products for superior ones. Under monopoly, the mandate raises welfare only when it induces a switch

from inferior to superior quality; if quality remains inferior, realized returns destroy surplus. Under duopoly, returns make inferior-product net revenue hump-shaped, so the equilibrium price supports either meet at a quality cutoff or are separated by a gap. With N sellers, competition benefits sophisticated consumers but can leave naive consumers selecting inferior products. Thus the quality and welfare effects of return regulation depend jointly on seller-side cost exposure and market structure.

Work in Progress

Persuade before Evidence (with Mingzhao Dai and Jiawei Zhang)

Optimal Headline Design (with Susanne Goldlücke and Federico Innocenti)

Hidden Contract and Credible Communication

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant Winter semester 2022-
Advanced Microeconomics I *(Tutorial, Master level)*

Teaching Assistant Summer Semester 2023-
Microeconomics II (Game Theory) *(Tutorial, Bachelor level)*

Conferences and Seminars

2026

- Brown Bag Seminar (Konstanz, Germany), The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications #15(Lisbon, Portugal), 2nd Berlin PhD Conference in Economics (Berlin, Germany) (poster), EARIE (Mannheim, Germany), Swiss Theory Day (Zurich, Swiss)

2025

- Brown Bag Seminar (Konstanz, Germany), The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications #14(Lisbon, Portugal), 1st Berlin Micro Theory & Behavioral Economics PhD Conference (Berlin ,Germany) (poster), Doctoral Workshop in Microeconomics (Konstanz, Germany)

2024

- Brown Bag Seminar (Konstanz, Germany), Berlin Micro Theory Ph.D. Workshop (Berlin, Germany), Swiss Theory Day (Bern, Swiss)

Skills

Language: Mandarin (Native), English (Professional), Cantonese (Intermediate), German (Basic)
Programming: Latex, R, Stata, z-Tree, Mathematica